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In the mood.
Valorisation of moods in an aesthetic economy

Abstract
The presence of economy in everything in our environment also takes possession of our moods; economy becomes about wellness and well-being. While moods concern our perceptions as a tuning of them the economic interests in moods have consequences for any relation to the world. Aesthetics understood in relation to perception and atmosphere offers a critical approach that should be seen in relation to existing discussions from Critical Theory about consumer culture and commodity aesthetics.

Keywords
Aesthetic economy, Perception, Atmosphere

1. Introduction

Everything seems today to be subject to economic valorisation. At the turn of the millennium, experiences were on the agenda in an experience economy, a title of a 1999 book by Joseph Pine and James Gilmore. More recent William Davies has discussed how pleasure and well-being form a happiness industry (Davies 2015). It seems like nothing is sacred when it comes to economy and, when speaking of experience economy and happiness industry, it crawls into our more private or even intimate relations to the environment when our moods become a target for economic interest and activity.

How experiences, happiness and moods are dealt with in economy is an empirical matter. I wish, philosophically, to ask about implications of moods as an element in economic activity when moods are understood as a characteristic of perception. What does it then mean when we “see” our environment, and even ourselves, as economic assets?

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What does it mean when we assume, and it is the important assumption in the following that we never perceive without specific preconditions affecting what and how we perceive and that we, at the same time, are deeply involved in forming these preconditions ourselves?

Including moods help dealing with this circularity of perception. Not by characterising different forms of moods but to understand how moods give a special tune or colour to our perception. Without this colouring our perceptions would be both deaf and blind. Moods are always present as conditioning our perceptions and these conditions change with how we interpret our relation to the world, an interpretation that in contemporary culture is subject to economic interests.

A significant starting point for such an approach is the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, in which mood is seen as fundamental for our world-relation. A terminological comment is here necessary as mood is the translation of the German *Stimmung*, a translation that is not without difficulties. Mood and *Stimmung* are important for the concept of atmosphere that Gernot Böhme develops as a fundamental concept in aesthetics and he suggests a connection between economy and mood through aesthetics, what he calls aesthetic economy and aesthetic capitalism (Böhme 2003 and 2017). Because mood concerns our relation to the world, where any activity is affected by moods and any engagement will consequently be influenced by moods, it becomes of interest to be aware of the significance of the moods in our productive engagement with the world. Here lies the economic value of moods: we profit not only from producing things but also from producing moods. In a philosophical context the interest relates to how these moods form our perception, hence how a particular interest and world interpretation is at work in our most fundamental approach to the environment.

Böhme offers a critical review on this topic in his *Aesthetic capitalism*, which builds on both the phenomenological approach to mood and atmosphere as well as on Critical Theory. A question here could be whether Böhme takes this discussion forward by including mood or we already find substantial characterisations in these older discussions.

2. Mood and attunement

When the English translation of Heidegger’s *Being and time* §29 uses mood for *Stimmung* and attunement for *Befindlichkeit* it conceals how
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*Stimmung* also relates to tune and tuning. *Stimmung* comes from the tuning of a musical instrument, and it relates to *Stimme*, voice. We use *Stimmung* for the mood we perceive to be present in a specific place due to the people present and certain activities taking place. Place and people are somehow harmonized into what we encounter and feel at the place similar to instruments being tuned into one complex accord. The question is not whether the place, or the music for that matter, is in tune only that we find a composition of different elements “playing together” in what we feel at a given moment at the place.

Perhaps we should even add that, keeping the relation to voice in mind, while we do not tune our voice we do bring it in harmony with other voices in singing and this harmonized tuning could also resonate with voices raised in a public assembly where one may agree to what is said, *Zustimmen*, or to reach agreement by casting a voting, *stimmen*, in what becomes an *Abstimmung*, to finally have something decided upon, *bestimmt*. The tuning is hence not merely sensuous, it is also intellectual.

I do not intend to give a philological account of these notions, and perhaps I am also pushing the connotations to their limits; I only wish to draw attention to how it matters for discussing mood and *Stimmung* in English. My first language, Danish, is here similar to German and reading the English translation sometimes is like reading a different text – something seems to miss the point, *etwas stimmt nicht*, and the conflicting discussions among the arguing philosophers could create a bad atmosphere, *Stimmung*. It is difficult to ignore connotations when reading and reflecting on words especially when reading an author like Heidegger who invites the reader to pay much attention to the language. Perhaps connotations sometimes mislead, but the difference between *Stimmung* and mood is significant, since mood in German and Danish relates to mind, however not with a line of explicit connotations as the case is with *Stimmung*. I will here use mood but one should pay attention to how it signifies a tuning of elements.

The interest we should take in mood is not about characterising any particular mood one can be in; it is in how mood in Heidegger’s terminology is an existential, i.e. it concerns *Dasein’s* structure of existence (Heidegger 1986: § 4, 9). Concrete moods are psychological phenomena but the fact that we are always in a particular mood is something that enables an opening of the world in which one will always “find him-/herself” (*sich befinden*) in a particular mood. No matter how indifferent we try to be, such as the ideal of the scientific mind is when
asking for a neutral and objective approach to phenomena, being indifferent will itself count as a particular mood.

The interest in a mood thus is not in the experience of it but in how any relation to, or disclosure of, the world must take place when our mood is already affected or tuned by the world we relate to. It leads to emphasizing how there are two aspects of finding oneself; to find oneself in a specific location and how one finds oneself to be. Both aspects are included in the concept *Befindlichkeit*, attunement, which stresses how being located somewhere is always to be affected and to be in a particular mood (Heidegger 1986: § 29).

Attunement reveals that we have been thrown into the world. We do not begin our relation to it from a particular neutral and non-affected starting point. Attunement is grounded in “thrownness” (*Geworfenheit*, see Heidegger 1986: 340). The tuning of attunement constitutes how we open the world, i.e. how we engage in it and at the same time are thrown into it and are engaged in it in the light of how we *can* engage in it. Our world relation is fundamentally displaying a hermeneutic circularity.

A short digression can throw light on a perspective of this. Heidegger notes that Aristotle does not treat feelings and affects in his psychology but in his rhetoric. Any utterance made is spoken with a voice (*Stimme*) of an orator who will always appear to the audience in some way. Rhetoric as “the art of giving effectiveness to truth” (Baldwin 1959: 5) reveals that even truth does not speak for itself, or we should say that in any situation, whatever there is to say, it will necessarily be subject to forms of persuasion. When Aristotle, in the first book of his *Rhetoric*, introduces the three forms of persuasion, *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* this order is not random as he considers character, *ethos*, to be a fundamental feature whatever the question is. Rhetoric is, like logic, an art of bringing out truth (Baldwin 1959: 9). This includes also when speaking about scientific matters, where one would expect the speaker’s person not to matter, but here we find a scientific *ethos*, an ideal of how I, as speaker, should show I forget myself for the subject I speak about. I should show the audience how it is the subject that arouses me; where the subject, through taking possession of me, has become mine and something I wish also to become the audience’s (Baldwin 1959: 12).

Heidegger’s use of attunement relates to his critique of the modern ideal of the thinking subject placed in confrontation with the object of thinking, an ideal in particular present in psychological approaches to
epistemology influencing many forms of modern philosophy indebted to a Cartesian tradition. In this tradition a world-relation is characterised by substituting engagement in the world with the world as a picture, as Heidegger discusses in *The age of the world picture* (Heidegger 1977), an age where the *subj ectum*, the foundation, becomes the certainty of knowledge provided by a self-legislating and self-sufficient subject of thinking. This is the task for a Cartesian *ego* given the authority to decide on what can be known and what secures knowledge (Heidegger 1977: 148-9). This approach to the world implies a mode of thinking as representing (*vorstellen*), where something is set before oneself (*etwas vor sich stellen*) and is in need of being placed correctly for which calculation serves to secure its position. Representing is then no longer “apprehending of that which is present” (Heidegger 1977: 149). Presence is substituted with representation of an object which confronts and resists one (*Gegen-ständige*); and to the handling of representation is added an ideal of stripping off the subject of its subjectivity to provide it with a neutral relation to the confronting objects.

A reason for dwelling on Heidegger is to emphasize how mood reflects an element in our world-relation that rejects the common sense understanding of being a psychological subject confronted with a, largely, material object. A different view on mood has consequences for our world-interpretation and for what is implied in combining mood an economy. Mood and attunement are also crucial for the characterisation of perception (*Wahrnehmung*) provided by Böhme in relation to the concept of atmosphere, a concept for which presence and world-engagement are essential. While Böhme relies on this approach of Heidegger he also draws attention to an aspect neglected in Heidegger’s analysis: the body.

Similar to Heidegger, Böhme’s concern is not for what we are affected by and what state it leaves us in but for the fact that we always find ourselves in a particular mood wherever we find ourselves to be, for which he also uses attunement (*Befindlichkeit*, see Böhme 2001: 81). What something does to us can be characterised as a tuning of us caused by the environment. “Mood assails” (Heidegger 1986: 136) and our concrete bodily presence should be included here. Space should not be perceived as an organisation of spatial elements in a geometric order we can approach as if we are neutral and unaffected. Space is tuned and is included in the characterising of our perception laid out in atmospheres that determine (*bestimmen*) our relation to the world.
by a tuning of us. Atmospheres must be characterised as tuned spaces (*gestimmte Räume*, see Böhme 2006: 25).

3. Mood and atmosphere

What began with a terminological comment on the translation of *Stimmung* to mood has brought us to see how this approach of Heidegger and Böhme establishes mood as a condition for any perception. Obviously, mood thus plays an essential role for our world-relation and keeping in mind the opening about mood becoming entangled in economic interests it seems equally obvious we should pursue what this combination of mood and economy implies. The concept of atmosphere offers itself here.

Atmosphere has been introduced by Böhme as a concept of perception that is not object-oriented. Instead perception is “understood as the experience of the presence of persons, objects and environments” (Böhme 1993: 116). It reintroduces into aesthetics a concern for the relation between environmental qualities and human states (Böhme 1993: 114) hence aesthetics is understood in the tradition from Baumgarten as a theory of sensorial cognition and not of art and judgements.

Atmosphere has a receptive and productive side. It is receptive like mood and attunement – atmospheres “assail” us and we are engaged in producing them. We produce deliberately when we organise the environment – the examples will not have to be very emphatic: they include also trivial things like setting the table for dinner guests or organizing and personalizing one’s working place – and when we present ourselves to others through dress, body-language and general appearance. We also do it implicitly in reproducing the environment through our different routines – in most situations together with others we will blend in with how we believe we should appear and how the places we share should be maintained and organized for common use. It is impossible not to contribute to creating atmospheres – simply being present has an effect. Any person entering a room will intervene into the atmosphere and alter it despite that person may wish to be as invisible as possible.

With the introduction of the pair reception and production we can draw a parallel to Herbert Marcuse’s *Eros and civilization*, which also plays a role for Böhme’s discussion of aesthetic capitalism. Marcuse
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uses reception and production to characterise the Western philosophical tradition as one where the receptive faculties are those that tend towards gratification and remain strongly committed to the pleasure principle as introduced by Freud from whom he takes a starting point, and production tends toward transcendence – we transcend what is present to produce something which furthermore serves the progress of reason (Marcuse 1974: 111).

Reception is seen as irrational instincts driving us to satisfaction. Such instincts seeking only unrestricted gratification will inevitably result in conflicts and pain hence a countermove is necessitated which is a transformation of the pleasure principle into a reality principle that “enforces a change not only in the form and timing of pleasure but in its very substance” (Marcuse 1974: 13). Pleasure is then reinterpreted and adjusted but an interpretation is no elimination and it implies now an internal conflict. Probably best known is here how sexuality is interpreted into forms serving society's interest in reproduction that gives occasion to interpret sexual desires of other forms as perversions (Marcuse 1974: 40 ff.). “[A]ll civilization has been organized domination” (Marcuse 1974: 34).

This opposition and preoccupation with production, whether it is production of material means for survival or of interpretations to survive on, makes us forget or crying down the importance of the receptive side. This gives tensions; Marcuse can talk about the dialectics of civilization (Marcuse 1974: 78 ff.). The intention here is not to follow him in detail, only to maintain how a receptive and sensorial side is transformed by rational interpretation, which becomes one-sided in focus or even blind to certain aspects present while at the same time elements of the receptive side are still present and influencing the interpretation. This makes moods of interest because they are present and inevitable, and they are largely interpreted as mere background for and secondary to what we have our focus on. However, the focus of our perception is influenced by what goes beyond the object of focus. The receptive side of being thrown into something and finding oneself subject to feelings, sentiments, desires and other emotions that we interpret in light of what is considered appropriate and educated also forms a relation to the world.

While we are affected by the environment we also, as said, produce it through our participation in it. We produce atmospheres which, as Böhme recognises, may seem a bit puzzling to say when atmospheres
are something intangible or at least not concrete objects but an in-between subject and object (Böhme 2013). Atmosphere is not an object of perception but a characteristic of what is in a perception when we understand perception as a way of being present and being affected in this presence: “atmospheres imbue everything, they tinge the whole of the world or a view, they bathe everything in a certain light, unify a diversity of impressions in a single emotive state” (Böhme 2013). For illustration a parallel can be drawn between atmosphere and stage design where concrete props transmit a specific atmosphere to the audience creating a perceptible reality (Böhme 2001: 117 ff.). Props as well as the actor (Chekov 1953: 47 ff.) make an atmosphere present just like the orator does by being present, by what is said, and by making the voice (Stimme) heard that affects the spectators and listeners by creating an atmosphere or particular mood (Stimmung).

4. Mood and economy

The production-reception dualism may be one we can find throughout especially modern Western practices. We find that an urge for productivity is dominating and engage in producing objects for different uses and find they have a use value relating to how well they serve their functions. The user will most likely feel satisfied and the products will contribute positively to the user’s mood – we talk about usability and customers’ satisfaction arising from the success of the use. Of course, such satisfaction may be of many kinds depending on the kind of use in question, whether it is a matter of functionality, of emotional interest, intellectual need or a line of different reasons for acquiring something.

Mood becomes here an outcome of particular products and actions, an important outcome as it affects how we spend our resources as we would prefer to be successful in our enterprises and take pleasure in the things we acquire and use even when that use is not strictly functional. However, we also mostly find it to be a side effect to our primary concern with doing things. How we feel about them comes second. When Böhme introduces aesthetic economy his point is to revise this understanding. To explain contemporary capitalism he draws attention to a required change from a system of needs that Hegel establishes to be the origin of the economic relationships in bourgeois
society to one where needs expand and change and “[c]ommodity production has as its aim not the creation of certain use-values, as such, but rather manufacture for sale” (Haug 1986: 16). Use-values become fluctuating with different interests. This is in particular the matter in a society where needs are no longer basic but can be defined in a variety of ways, a society where luxury production becomes more prevalent and is not even thought of as luxury anymore “but is now taken for granted as a universal standard of living” (Böhme 2017: 10). What has happened in recent decades is a transformation of needs into desires; needs can be satisfied while desires cannot and will only be intensified by being fulfilled. This forms the basis for Böhme’s aesthetic economy, which he sees as a contribution to a renewal of the critique of cultural industry by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (Böhme 2017: 19).

I will leave this particular debate about cultural industry and the question whether Böhme’s critique is justified, and instead keep attention on moods in contemporary production and consumption. If the products we use can give us satisfaction when they serve their function and such satisfaction is worth pursuing, which I believe is fairly uncontroversial to say, why focus on the functionality of the product and not directly on the mood itself? Why not expand the means of reaching the consumer’s mood into producing satisfaction itself instead of via products?

This has been a question to answer for decades. We find atmosphere appearing as a description of what is done in relation to staging products for consumers already used by Philip Kotler in the early 1970s (Kotler 1973-74). The shoes, he writes, are no longer bought for the use but for pleasure, for what they make one feel. Another example of his is the organisation of antique shops, that appear to be chaotic in order to give to the costumer, browsing among all sorts of things, a feeling of discovering hidden treasures (Kotler 1973-74: 55 ff.). A more recent example concerns the Danish form of cosiness, hygge, to which a proper translation has traditionally caused difficulties, which may now be over due to its success on agendas of fashionable life-style. Maybe one would say that Money can’t buy me hygge (Linnet 2011) but its position in life-style business has since tried to prove it different. Not only books are written, and sold, about it but a line of specific objects for creating hygge are now for sale.

Advertising has for decades been intended for creating atmospheres – and if not using the term atmosphere then for the creation of emotional appeals. It is a motivation for Wolfgang Fritz Haug’s critique
of the commodity aesthetics written at the same time as Kotler. Haug finds that this use of aesthetic elements is one of making promises of possible use-value – it is about building expectations of what it will be like to be in possession of the object and use it (Haug 1986: 16). Of course we buy things to use them, but there can be far more value in the additions to the product such as the brand and the life-style. A chair can be a simple and cheap object, made robust for specific use like the 1006 Navy Chair by Emeco designed for the navy in 1944; but when it becomes a design-object of particular branded attention the same chair also represents an entirely different value.

Today we see how a step further is taken from creating narratives promising consumers pleasure to approach the consumers’ feelings of satisfaction directly – where the product is really about brands and story-telling for which the actual thing is only a means. We find this in an example motivating Davies’ book on happiness industry. At the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos in 2014 there was, among the professionals in business and economy as well as billionaires, also a Buddhist monk inviting the delegates every morning to meditate and learn relaxation techniques (Davies 2015: 1-2). “The forum was awash with talk of ‘mindfulness’, a relaxation technique formed out of a combination of positive psychology, Buddhism, cognitive behavioural therapy and neuroscience” (Davies 2015: 2).

Well-being invades the economy creating a market for wellness products. Or it could be the other way around and economy invades human conditions in the broadest sense now targeted as possible markets for desires. Satisfying user needs through products of a high user-value is to go a long way if satisfaction can be achieved directly. Sadness due to a loss and causing a low mood, what could be known before as melancholia and in some periods be considered a characteristic of the sensitive, poetic soul even to be fashionable, can now be labelled depression to be met with a short cut in treatment: chemistry. If people can come to feel better through pharmaceuticals and neurochemicals the need for talking about moods in terms of human existence and situation vanishes (see Davies 2015: 161 ff.; Rosa 2005: 386 ff.). Drugs provide a far simpler and more efficient answer than Freud and Heidegger do and facial recognition and scanners are more reliable than therapeutic conversation. “[H]appiness science reaches the point where it can bypass not only traditional surveys and psychological tests, but all psychological and verbal indicators of mood, to access the mood itself in its physical manifestation” (Davies 2015: 231).
When moods are fundamental for our perception we thus end up discussing how economic interests constitute our interpretation of the environment. Böhme’s critique of political economy is a contribution addressing the growth paradigm of contemporary capitalism by introducing what he calls “stage value” (Inszenierungswert) which proves to be more than about taking traditional sales strategies to the extreme but is a decisive drive in the economy. Along with that, his approach also addresses how economic interests become a constitutive element in our perception.

5. Mood and critique

Böhme questions the kind of critique he sees Haug a proponent for, namely that stage value is added to the product’s use-value as something superfluous. He asks if such values are only seductive means for needless consume and not answering any real needs. Judging stage-values as superfluous may be a limited way of viewing needs, namely as if needs are only about sustaining a basic, physical existence. Needs, Böhme points out, are transformed into desires and desires become needs redefined when capitalism “develops beyond the satisfaction of elementary needs and serves the unending intensification and stag-setting of life” (Böhme 2017: 68). A desire for staging oneself becomes a fundamental need in contemporary capitalism.

Desires enable growth in contemporary economy and must be included into the existing critique of consumer culture within Critical Theory. Despite his critical comments, Böhme takes Haug’s critique of commodity aesthetics as an important contribution to build on. Haug has introduced the appearance of use-value in contrast to the use-value experienced in the actual use to explain how the sensorial field for creation of values becomes decisive for accumulation of capital. Fascination is crucial, and “[w]hoever controls the product’s appearance can control the fascinated public by appealing to them sensually” (Haug 1986: 17). However, Böhme believes that in the end Haug fails to see how a different kind of use emerges from the fascination created and how this is not only something added to push the existing use beyond basic needs into something false but is itself a new form of needs (Böhme 2017: 25). The seduction of brands to make consumers prefer one label to another becomes itself the real value for consumers.
as a form of identification and expression for the individual despite how shallow and meaningless others may find it to be.

Whether Böhme gives full credits to Haug can be questioned. Not unlikely Böhme it is also important for Haug to point out that the commodity aesthetics forms an independent character as a world of illusions “in which one sees one’s desires and believes them to be real” and where “[a]ny other world, different from that provided by the commodities, is almost no longer accessible to them” (Haug 1986: 52) though the “almost” also indicates Haug’s belief in the possibility of seeing through the illusions. Haug calls the veil of illusions a technocracy of sensuality and emphasizes how it has implications for our world relation when emotional narratives of consume become so dominant that alternatives are pushed aside and even our perception changes.

Returning to the complexity of a receptive and productive side of our world-relation, where sensuous gratification confronts rational production, we can with Haug relate it to the abstraction and separation of elements in our thinking fundamental to Western philosophy – in its origin the separation of appearance and being. In this separation appearances, or illusions, dominates; this is what Plato’s allegory of the cave demonstrates (Haug 1986: 45-6). Such domination is also practiced in social life where people are dominated through use of sensorial means that are then taken to be reality. The prisoners in Plato’s cave find themselves in a good atmosphere; not in a mood of captivity and claustrophobia chained at the bottom of the cave. They are exactly unaware of how their needs and desires are formed by the gaolers’ production as well as their own participatory reproduction, which displays the dialectic of reception and production.

The necessity of capitalism is such an illusion mediated by the sensorial means that demonstrates another separation between being, the object of use, and appearance, the promised use where the surface appearance “is the expression […] of a social relationship” (Haug 1986: 49). Techniques for performing this relationship, for creating illusions for the prisoners, are developed to produce what Haug calls a second skin disembodied from the objects and “preparing the way for the real distribution of the commodity” (Haug 1986: 50). What sells is not as much the useful object causing us to be in a good mood through use but the mood itself. A further consequence is that the dominance of illusions over what there is proves to be in fact a self-dominance.

Haug, thus, seems much in agreement with Böhme when it comes to the fundamental influence of the sensorial elements on perception,
but in disagreement when it comes to the emancipatory goal, coming to which Haug does utter some rather manifest and naïve views – like when he states that “[w]ith shades and shadows the illusion industry populates the spaces left empty by capitalism, which only socialism can fill with reality” (Haug 1986: 121) – exemplified with TV-programs showing new agricultural machinery and production methods in the industry instead of empty entertainment.

Haug seems to demonstrate an ideal of emancipation closer to a classic ideal of unmasking illusions to reveal the hidden but real powers rather than maintaining a dialectical relation between the present affective elements like moods and our participation in and interpretation of them. Böhme’s approach may as well appear lacking some critical bite. To state the illusions of commodity aesthetics are no illusions but form the reality for modern individuals does not answer questions of how we could or should relate to these realities. Are they simply to take as they are or do they represent interests we should ask critical questions about? Perhaps the reality of a consumer in contemporary culture represents the consumer’s reality where consume of particular brands forms the desired and true identity for this person, but is a consumer identity then also to accept as true existence?

We do arrive at questions that only complicate the problem when our society through our performances – and Marcuse introduces a performance principle as the reality principle of modern society, in which performance (Leistung) is to be understood as achievement (Marcuse 1974: 45 ff.) – becomes an affluent society. In this society consumption escalates and gives rise to a permanent feeling of scarcity met with means for further growth which is, according to Böhme, exactly the ideology to dismiss (Böhme 2017: 51).

Whether his critique is sufficient as a critique that can dismiss the ideology of current consumption-based capitalism is for further investigations to answer. We can, I assume, conclude that the appropriation of mood by economic interests does constitute a challenge when mood must be understood as Stimmung, i.e. as a tuning of the elements conditioning our perception. The story about happiness industries is not one of yet another element added to the narratives about consumption but one of transforming our sensorial and emotional relation to the environment as Critical Theory has brought awareness to since early 1970s. This is then a task for philosophy to characterise the consequences of when we are involved in such dialectic of perceptions
being conditioned while these same conditions are formed through our activities.

One way of pursuing this complex is through a phenomenological investigation of perception i.e. by asking for the legitimacy of the characterisation we offer of perception, which may question the understanding of perception as a determination of something as something. Such determination is at the cost of an “apprehending of that which is present”; it only grants a particular aspect of the present object abandoning the presence for the determination of it.

Mood as an essential aspect of perception in the concept of atmosphere as a new aesthetics points at how aesthetics can offer a substantial contribution to understanding what it implies when an aesthetic economy takes possession of our interpretation of moods and furthermore forms what moods we consider to be of value – when a technique of desires takes possession of our thinking and, to conclude in a Heidegger inspired fashion, find an end of thinking to only appear as a technique, in this case a technique of enhancing consume and contributing to economic growth rates.

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