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Better to Be in Tune
Between Resonance and Responsivity

Abstract
The paper aims at understanding why the notion of “atmosphere” has boomed recently in the Humanities. It presents an introductory survey of this concept, mostly relying on the neophenomenological radical externalisation of the affective. Started from psychiatry (Tellenbach) and philosophy (Schmitz’s phenomenology and Böhme’s aesthetics) the atmospheric approach provides now a wide application in all scientific fields that have to do with human and not strictly functional-measurable parameters.

Keywords
Atmosphere, Affective Turn, Aesthetics.

Received: 09/03/2020
Approved: 18/05/2020
Editing by: Federica Scassillo

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1. New vibrations

The fascination for the neo-phenomenological perspective that undoubtedly underpins my atmospherologic studies lies for me in the unconventional but suggestive combination of subtle description of vital experiences (especially if involuntary) and an attractive historical-philosophical diagnosis of Western thought. The very topic of resonance also makes this combination possible. However, this topic would certainly appear a little heretical to the most orthodox phenomenologists, insofar it goes beyond a simple description of the type of relationships that our being-in-the-world is based on, but it also ventures to evaluate and condemn their modern degeneration. For this reason, in what follows I will compare some more neutral phenomenological theories of resonance or responsivity (Thomas Fuchs, Bernhard Waldenfels) with the ambitious sociological research on resonance recently proposed by Hartmut Rosa (2019) and Hermann Schmitz’s (new) phenomenology of felt-bodily communication.

Also Western culture undoubtedly provided some examples of the ontological model of resonance long before the phenomenology and sociology of the last hundred years. A truly emblematic case, already mentioned by Gernot Böhme is the theosophical doctrine of the *signatura* elaborated by Jacob Böhme at the beginning of the seventeenth century (*De Signatura Rerum*, 1622). Every interaction, every communication, and even more so every understanding is described not as a physical pressure but as a co-vibration or resonance triggered by a signature or essence, the latter being understood as the receptacle, container, or cabinet of the (divine) spirit. According to this “grand concert of the world” (Böhme 2017: 123-34), human bodies, compared to the soundbox of a musical instrument and understood as images of the Being of all beings, would be a perfect sounding board of the world. Ever since birth they would make their instrument vibrate and would even be able to resonate with the opposite of their own signature if influenced by that of others (expressing this variation also physiognomically): a good instrument can make a bad one momentarily latent vibrate-resonate, and vice versa, etc. In reminding us of this pre-modern physiognomic ontology brought forward by his namesake and cleansing it from its most metaphysical-theological features, Gernot Böhme rightly alludes to an unprecedented quasi-musical phenomenology of resonance and, as a result, an ontology alternative to the predominant one, focused on things (Böhme 2017: 44-5).
But don’t get your hopes up too much. Jacob Böhme was an exceptional case – to the point that his ontology was immediately relegated to the margins of Western rationalistic culture and exiled from quantitative epistemology into the slippery territory of mysticism. Nonetheless, now resonance seems to have fallen back into grace, and without necessarily trespassing into mysticism. The urgency of today’s new theories of resonance, in fact, is certainly not due to some mystical backlash but to a basic intellectual “atmosphere” closely linked to the so-called “affective turn” in the humanities (cfr. Leys 2011; Wiesse, Pfaller 2018).

Of course I am aware that complaining about today’s loss of resonance may seem like just another jeremiad. However, there is no doubt that today’s trend to produce superficial soundscapes – namely to turn public places into musical environments (elevators, parking lots, shops, stations, etc.) – is nothing but the desperate and shallow answer (almost completely disembodied and de-socialized) to the feeling that public places and everyday life in general seem to have lost any capability of resonance. The same obviously goes for people’s tendency to deeply cut themselves out from the world through earphones and only focus their attention on the screen of electronic devices. It is precisely in order to combat, at least in part, this indifference of and to the world that one looks for the constant company of artificial sounds instead of the usual environmental soundscape: it is for this same reason that one enjoys online images instead of things made of flesh and blood, or that one reads fantasy stories totally alien to one’s surrounding environment and life. It therefore seems obvious not to expect any resonance from places, things and people, and not even from history (could the talk of the “end of history” mean anything else?). Nor can one find resonance in some minimal form of defensive self-resonance. Every house-cooked and domesticated self-resonance, in fact, is so controlled that it’s impossible for the other to express itself with an unexpected voice – i.e. to be really Other! This domestic self-resonance turns out to be more a narcissistic echo than a real dimension of resonance, which, as we’ll see, always implies self-transcendence.

Against this “silence” of the world, numerous attempts to bring resonance to the fore are now being made. On the practical level, there are several examples of forced auratization and (allegedly) charismatic attitudes. However, the goal of these attempts is far from clear: is it not the case that the insistence on the loss of resonance, which attests to the disappearance of grand narratives, is itself yet another grand narrative (or counter-narrative)? Is resonance something that should happen but
unfortunately doesn’t happen at all or happens less and less? Is it something that we should be actively dedicated to make happen? Or is it rather something that happens anyway, where at most one needs to control its lack (hypo-resonance) or excess (hyper-resonance)? But, most of all, what is resonance? And, as a result, what legitimacy might this concept have?

As often happens in situations where the level of affectivity is not thematized, one is perfectly aware of resonance only when it is missing, i.e. when one doesn’t feel in tune with the surrounding space one feels as though something is lacking in quality, meaningless and even (affectively) unreal\(^1\). When this occurs, it is because one’s body, flooded by disturbing experiences, is no longer of any help and “does not offer a steady anchor against the twists and turns of experience” (Waldenfels 2011: 34). In other words: being unable to extract “the invariants from the flowing array”, the body does not resonate “to this invariant structure or [is not] attuned to it” (Gibson 1986: 249).

Which is what one normally does. More than a deficient being (\textit{Mängelwesen}), as claimed by the tradition of negative anthropology from Herder to Gehlen, man is actually a being exposed to a surplus of stimuli and an excess of demands asking for resonance. This surplus explains the unexpected positive interpretation of the modern age as “lightening” proposed by Sloterdijk (2011-2016). Most of all, it prompts us to look at action in a non-behavioristic way (meaning obviously “behavioristic” just in the most naive sense), that is, to see it not only as the realization of a purpose but also always as an answer to the affordances of the phenomenal world (its demands, appeals, invitations, requests, and even claims and provocations). Thinking of lifeworldly experience as a creative resonance with the world means avoiding the strict alternatives between action/passion and autonomy/dependence (Waldenfels 1994: 133). Above all, rectifying a tradition dominated by intellectualism and activism, it means promoting an extensive pathic philosophy rather than a gnostic one (in Erwin Straus’ terms). The normal subject experiences no gap between the cognitive and the pathic: their feelings are a precise reflection of the subject’s relationship – \textit{qua} psychophysical being – with their environment.

The theory of resonance as the simultaneous transfer of a rhythmic process to another medium obviously implies an original correlation

\(^1\) Some patients, for example, are perfectly aware of the emotional meaning of the images shown to them – they simply don’t feel it.
(variously described since Uexküll’s theoretical biology) between organism and environment, and between appetizing vectors of the first and meaning contents of the second. But it also implies something more, by referring not to the precise (or perhaps only more intense) repetition of a previous event but to an (explicit or only latent) motor reaction to processes that are in turn motor processes\(^2\). Focusing on resonance as a phenomenological-ontological descriptive model therefore means ruling out any mechanical-causal explanatory model, as this would be unsuitable for the lifeworldly phenomenal dimension. However, – it is worth noting that enhancing the resonance paradigm does not necessarily mean extending it to a metaphysical principle of “interconnectedness” – it simply means highlighting an affective and felt-bodily attunement.

In what follows, I’d like to examine in what way atmospheric perception, understood as an affective and largely pre-reflexive bodily communication triggered by a feeling permeating a certain lived space, has to do with today’s trendy phenomenon of resonance (often studied in music)\(^3\). I could say that atmospheres, as feelings poured out into the lived and pericorporeal space, can only find their adequate sounding board in the lived or felt body – not in organic sensors, let alone in the mind. But would this be enough? Before I proceed to specifically address this issue by sketching a phenomenology of felt-bodily resonance, I cannot help but start from Hartmut Rosa’s voluminous sociological research, which undoubtedly had the merit of ensuring that the attention of scholars focused on the issue of resonance.

\(^2\) Provided that it is true that “everything that is manifest is only an intangible original movement” and that “everything responds to another” (Lippe 2011: 101-2).

\(^3\) Even when it is not immediately translated into an explicit body language, music is always perceived in a felt-bodily way. You can’t escape it, just as you can’t escape the song of the sirens. Instead of being a way of thinking with one’s ears, as Adorno claims, music resonates synaesthetically (especially in jazz and rock music). It penetrates not only into the ear but also into the belly, it accompanies and/or modifies one’s heartbeat and suggests a certain rhythm to one’s legs (not necessarily expressed in the form of dance). In short, it involves the whole physical body and especially the felt body, calling it to be its most faithful possible sounding board. And, in so doing, it contributes (at least as much as smell does) to the wonders of *memoire involontaire*. Sometimes, especially in its essentiality of mere noise, sound becomes intolerable even for one who should be accustomed to it: this happens to the character played by Marlon Brando, who in the famous initial sequence of *Last Tango in Paris* becomes, involuntarily and painfully, the sounding board of the noise of an elevated railroad. The music-resonance link obviously deserves much attention (cfr. Scassillo 2020).
2. Against the mutism of the world

Rosa’s ambitious book (2019) actually assigns a broad descriptive (diagnostic) and even normative (therapeutic) value to the implicitly “romantic” concept of resonance. It provides a wide philosophical-sociological examination aimed at contrasting the capitalist dictatorship of the growth-acceleration-innovation triad (increase logic). Nonetheless, Rosa mitigates the pessimism of critical theory and reconsiders its predominant cognitive aspects, attested also in its more recent versions. The enemy is clear: the current “dynamic stabilization” that forces everyone to increasingly accelerate in order to maintain their position in the world and thus to avoid an otherwise inevitable slippery slope. The consequence of this acceleration is the combined effect of alienation and reification, further increased by the mediatization and manipulability of the situations one lives in (including the bodily ones). This is reflected in the loss of a robust bodily (ecological, historical, political and subjective) relationship – as such prior to any analytical and subjectivistic perspective but not to sociality and culture (as it’s only natural from a sociological point of view) – with the world, which no longer speaks and responds. To combat all this, Rosa advocates not so much a slowdown but, rather, a good life (irreducible to the optimization of resources) and subjective well-being, i.e. a kind of relationship of mutual vibration both between mind and body and between body and world. Thanks to the peculiar “quality” of this relationship, subject and environment come in contact: this way the former escapes its obsession with appropriation and the latter its silence, and they both can express themselves with their own “voice” until they’re both transformed.

Every “real” resonance would therefore imply a real “encounter”, a permanent oscillation. Subjects must neither be rigidly non-reactive to the world nor lose themselves in it, but rather rely on a desiring-affective and evaluating-cognitive balanced relationship. Likewise, the world must present itself as neither reified nor totally chaotic (cacophony). Today, one who tries to escape reification and the identification between well-being and accelerated growth can find refuge in oases of

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4 Hence the difference between the model of resonance and that of recognition (Honneth 1995). Communities of resonance experience the same spaces of (also narrative) resonance without exclusively counting on the social sphere and assuming a third party in which two subjects recognise each other, as instead happens in the processes of recognition.
resonance, which are fundamental drive sources of human action, but – unfortunately – there is no guarantee of success. A possibly different and resonant way of being in the world should refer to people (horizontal resonance)\(^5\), to the material world (diagonal resonance)\(^6\) and, finally, to life as a whole (vertical resonance)\(^7\). These “axes of resonance”, which prove to be basic needs, are distinguished only methodologically, but in everyday life they are often mixed\(^8\), always giving rise to intermediate degrees between extreme poles like resonance and mutism.

It would be wrong, however, to consider Rosa’s research just as an ambitious and all-encompassing fresco. Even if they may not be fully satisfactory, the answers he gives to a whole series of probable objections – especially in the last section of the book – show full awareness of the controversial nature of many of his theses. Let’s have a look at the points that work with my neo-phenomenological approach to resonance.

a) Resonance is defined as an anti-exploitation attitude as opposed to the logic of growth and reification. This means that every intentional commitment to make resonance available and especially to accumulate and control it ends up in failure – it would be a performative contradiction to say “make your life resonant!”.

b) There can be no situation of full and complete resonance. The fascination for different and more resonant relationships with the world (for example in pre-modern cultures) really stems from modern alienation. Above all, the exclusion of any alienating moment risks making resonance a politically dangerous and nostalgic concept, because it would become an ideology or at least a simulation of resonance (moreover based on the rejection of the other!) – in other words, it would turn into the echo chamber for an imaginary community, which is exactly what every authoritarian regime looks for.

\(^5\) This consists of family, friendship and politics. Its worst falling point today seems to be a democracy that appears too disembodied, anesthetized and de-emotionalized to offer an oasis of vital resonance to its citizens.

\(^6\) This can also be triggered by commodities, when they are considered not as such but as promises of resonance. Its worst enemy is the ecological crisis due to the overexploitation of nature.

\(^7\) This consists of religion, nature, history and art. Its main negative side today is a general psychological crisis.

\(^8\) Work, sport and music, for example, are forms of resonance among persons but also between persons and things.
c) Resonance should not be trivially identified with harmony or consonance. It is, rather, an emotional answer to something unavailable. There can be no real resonance if everything is beautiful, neatly arranged, controlled and predictable – that is, devoid of irritating and uncontrollable aspects. Even when it is predictable, a situation must at least come after a dissonant experience or allude to an uncontrollable and presaged “despite this”.

d) Being a constant oscillation, resonance is neither a simple mechanical echo, in which the parties have no responding voice of their own, nor simple passivity. Indeed, persons respond to the world’s call also by acting as primary tuning forks; not only by selectively controlling the forms of resonance, but also by inducing the world to react with new forms of resonance (self-efficacy) – here, however, Rosa still appears unduly influenced by some constructionist dogmas of the linguistic turn.

e) Mitigating any existentialist mood, resonance places more emphasis on being supported by the world than on being thrown into it. Since resonance seems to thus imply a coincidence between being (Sein) and “ought” (Sollen), for Rosa a repulsive or indifferent relationship with the world can never be a form of resonance (not even negative) but only a form of alienation or estrangement. Unfortunately, this tacitly laudatory definition deprives the notion of resonance of its (very useful) neutral phenomenological-descriptive function.

f) For fear that his theory might be labelled as esoterism, Rosa is particularly careful not to substantiate the concept of resonance. This means that nothing is resonant in itself, since each culture needs resonance axes to rely on, and these axes can vary according to the historical-cultural-geographic-institutional and even biographical context.

Art, for example, is certainly an oasis of resonance, because beauty is exactly the expression of the possible mutual responsiveness of subject and world. Nonetheless, it must always imply some unavailability, whether it is the inexplicable inspiration of the artist, the unpredictable reception of the work or the risk involved in every creation, etc.

Even if Rosa underlines that humans, from birth, are already exposed to a non-resonant world!

Catholic culture, for example, would be more sensitive than Protestant culture to the quasi-magic resonance of places, things, earthly and otherworldly processes, even if the lower porosity of Protestant culture towards the world would favor (at least in principle) a greater resonance toward social otherness. Moreover, women and young people would be more sensitive to resonance, etc.
g) And, finally, resonance should not be identified with a subjective sentimental state (emotion as such is not resonance!), but should be understood in a strictly relational sense, as a non-causal bi-directional relationship mode involving the felt body, the mind and the experiential world.

Regarding my specific topic (felt-bodily resonance) it’s worth noting that Rosa fully welcomes the phenomenological distinction between *Leib* and *Körper*, considering the former as the fulcrum both of the active assimilation of the world and of the passive experience one makes of it. But most of all, he emphasizes the world’s pathic presence and presentness (Griffero 2018), i.e. the repulsive or mixed qualities that give the world a real albeit unpredictable significance and appeal to us without originating from us. He even accepts the atmospherologically and ontologically subversive idea of the in-betweenness as a relationship preceding its relata.

On the basis of assumptions that are very close to my own pathic aesthetics, Rosa can effectively diagnose a serious loss of bodily resonance in the modern age. Instead of making the body an efficient and subtle sounding board, the modern dynamic stabilization, in fact, tries to make it as manipulable as possible and to enhance its performance (even if paradoxically through non-western practices!), turning it into a resource and a capital intentionally oriented to the world and acting as a projection field for any commercial desire. This results in well-known pathologies such as burnout, psychosomatic disorders, depression, constant sense of failure and inadequacy, etc., which are mistakenly (and pointlessly) opposed by alleged reactivation strategies such as bio products and the industry of contact (pharmacies, perfumes, fitness, tattoos, tanning, massage, fashion and clothing, etc.).

But it’s time to move on from this sociological account of the crisis and of the desirable reactivation of resonance. I will now discuss Thomas Fuchs’ phenomenological-psychopathological analysis of resonance.

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12 Rosa underlines, for example, the active-passive (protective-relational) role of the skin and the breath (the area of the breast concerned being the organ of resonance par excellence). He also highlights the more culturalized fields, irreducible to naturalistic causalism, of eating and drinking, whose pathological reverse is a symptom of a deteriorated relationship with the world. The body’s resonance then becomes more and more articulated – and better defined from the standpoints of history, geography and gender – through the voice, the gaze, the face, movement, stillness, sleep, laughter, cry and love (while sexuality may instead also be devoid of resonance).
3. Felt bodily resonance

It is well known: the thesis that the body is a “a sort of sounding board” of feelings and emotions had a famous as well as controversial anticipation in William James’ idea (James 1890) that feelings are nothing more than bodily modifications: we are sad because we cry, we do not cry because we are sad! At least in its moderate form – body resonance is an indispensable component of sentiment, even if it’s almost unnoticeable because it happens on the vegetative level of the musculature or peripheral circulation – this theory has the merit of seeing the affective as a bodily element and thus of paving the way for those who, like Fuchs, fully recognize that persons feel atmospheres, Stimmungen and feelings (in my terms: affordances and their atmospheric set) through their felt-bodily modifications. Hence the thesis: “the felt body [Leib] is in some way the ‘resonance body’ of the affective space” insofar “it translates expression into impression” (Fuchs 2000: 197).

Fuchs’ approach focuses on the idea that the affective space (Stimmungsraum) is never neutral but, as long acknowledged by Gestalt-psychology, is rather richly populated by affordances (values, expressive qualities, even atmospheres) whose radiance influences the experiencer’s moods. Even though his perspective is not totally anti-projectivistic – a mood, in fact, would also influence the characters of the environment “to a certain extent” (Fuchs 2000: 194) – he defines the felt-bodily resonance as the affective-motor effect exerted by atmospheric feelings. The latter are well distinguished from impulses, which are rather drives who ask the environment a question instead of answering it. He thinks, more specifically, of a double sounding board involving both intra-psychic vibrations and those produced by the interaction with other beings or forms.

Without entirely accepting his distinction among atmospheres (closer to the outer pole), feelings (closer to the inner pole) and Stimmungen or moods (halfway between the two poles) (Fuchs 2014), one can certainly agree that their felt-bodily resonance is based on contraction and expansion (Fuchs 2000: 218 ff.). More precisely, resonance, which can also be of short duration, manifests itself in flow sensations (e.g. love, shame, disgust), vibrations or oscillations (laughing), narrowing and widening directions (spasm, dissolution), vertical directions (feeling down, being exalted), and expulsive or emanative directions (motion impulses, crying), thus giving life to an expression that may be expansive or expulsive, emanative or recessive, attractive or receptive. This “giving
life”, in any case, should not be understood as a cause-effect process, because joy, for example, would not be joy at all if it were not a certain bodily resonance (expansion of the chest). The resonance process, therefore, is not a causal relationship but an analogic correspondence (Fuchs 2000: 220).

Resonance must then rely on an appropriate (momentary or permanent) individual felt-bodily disposition. Indeed, it can also be “silenced”. This happens for example when adults chose to defensively prevent it in search of self-control and self-domination, but, above all, this can be seen in the current tendency to consider the felt-bodily counterpart of feelings as something improper (somatisation), or in the attempt to artificially manipulate it (psychotropic drugs, etc.) or to partly control it, which results in well-known psychosomatic disorders (up to total lack of feeling or alexithymia). Think of the pathological crystallization of the normal ability to oscillate based on the polyvalence of life, or of the lack of balance between cognitive moments and affective ones. In such cases, the resonance process happens monolithically and with excessive intensity, so much so that, while maniacs find everything significant, paranoiacs feel everything as threatening, etc. In my own terms, the situational atmospheriness here loses its natural polyvalence ‒ what I called vagueness (Griffero 2014a: 1-7) ‒ to become pathological ambiguity (Fuchs 2000: 243).

An expression, therefore, is the integrative reformulation of a pathic and felt-bodily perception, in short an intercorporeal resonance that as such can be already recognized already in newborns, whose innate bodily-mimetic (proprioceptive, motor and visual)${}^{13}$ scheme shows the affinity between one’s own body and that of others. An intercorporeal resonance, which explains mimetic affinity without having to resort to analogies or associations, can be of two types: a) complementary, even if probably followed by a possible antagonistic reaction, such as when receiving a stink eye triggers contraction, or b) mimetic, i.e. based on an emphatic correspondence to the feelings and situations of others, such as when tiredness or joy prove to be really contagious.

It’s important to underline that Fuchs also applies his idea of resonance to the correspondence between brain, organism and environment. Neuronal networks (microscopic world), in fact, do not statically reflect the external world but vibrate in a coordinated and isomorphic way with the environment (macroscopic world) (Fuchs 2010: 178-82).

${}^{13}$ Cfr. also Fuchs (2008: 22-9).
The recognition of an initially elusive image, inexplicable on a purely physiological level, would be made possible by “the resonance of a certain pattern with the constellation of stimuli in the image”, that is, by a transformation (similar to the metabolic one) that provides “new coherence between the sensory system and the environment” (Fuchs 2010: 164). Provided that all this applies, more generally, to movement, Fuchs claims, however, that this integral system of neuronal and sensomotor activity has no specific brain localization but “continues to be self-perpetuating according to the patterns with which it comes into contact so long as its ‘natural vibrations’ resonate with the environmental patterns” (Fuchs 2010: 169).

Even apart from this (for me) questionable neuro-scientific application, Fuchs surely offers a detailed analysis of bodily resonance and, no less importantly, of the psychopathological consequences of its probable deficits. This relationship between the organism and the world, however, is not always referred to with the term “resonance”. This is the case of Waldenfels’ theory of responsivity, which in my view is undoubtedly a relevant part of the current boom of resonance.

4. *The human being as the animal which responds*

Waldenfels starts from a medical definition of health as “fitting”. One is in health when “the manifestation of life in an individual fits completely with their biological requirements which emerge from the encounter between their physiological ‘performance potentiality’ and their external life situation” (Grote 1921: 8). Disease can thus be considered as a “defective responsiveness” or as bad fitting (Goldstein 1995: 330), in short as “unresponsivity” (Grote 1921: 9). In Waldenfels’ works, “answering” and “responding” go beyond their linguistic meaning and become “the basic feature of all speech and action” in the realm of the living, where, besides, responding to the invitation expressed in a question always means responding to something that is in turn a form of answer. Any saying should already be understood as an implicit form of questioning. Regardless of this quasi-hermeneutical circularity, the important thing to notice is that “responding” refers to “intermediate events behind the acts of speech and action, which are not to be linked by any order brackets” (Waldenfels 2016: 327) and cannot be explained only in

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14 Waldenfels misspells his surname as Grothe.
terms of intentionality (what I respond to is not constituted by me) and communication (which somewhat would neutralize the other).

Waldenfels’ insistence on the passive and involuntary character of the response processes fully converges with my pathic and atmospherologic aesthetics. To describe “those events which are not at our disposal, as if merely waiting for a prompt or command, but rather happen to us, overcome, stir, surprise, attack us”, in fact, “it appears appropriate to use the old term ‘pathos’ which […] announces a learning through suffering, yet not a learning of suffering” (Waldenfels 2011: 26). This involuntary participation in affordances or Gestaltic Aufforderungscharaktere understood as “a surplus of possibilities” (Waldenfels 1994: 132-3, 146) means that the experiencer must be thought of in the dative and not the nominative case.

This “original passivity” (Waldenfels 2011: 29) needs a “phenomenology which is grounded in pathos and directed toward responsivity” (Waldenfels 2011: 21). It follows that “the entity which bears the title ‘subject’ in the modern era appears first as patient and respondent,” and this occurs in such a way that the subject is involved, “not as initiator but as somebody who is literally subject to certain experiences” (Waldenfels 2011: 28).

Behind intentional acts, ascribed to a subject in terms of authorship or origin, there appear events that overcome or happen to us. Those events belong neither to a first-person perspective as subjective acts that we perform, nor to the third-person perspective as an objective process registered or effected from the outside. They require a language in which the id or Es is entangled with me [mich] or tied to me [mir]. In this respect, the ego, appearing in the accusative or the dative, precedes the ego in the nominative. From the very beginning I am involved, but not under the title of a responsible author or agent. In order to underline this passive pre-status of the so-called subject I use the term “patient,” which is to be taken in its literal sense. The corresponding status would be that of a respondent who responds to what strikes him or her. (Waldenfels 2011: 46)

In relation to these pathic-responding experiences, “every justification, acceptance, or evaluation is already too late”, nor are there “sufficient conditions” for the possibility of such experiences (Waldenfels 2011: 29). In stressing that “what happens to us and confronts us” are events “in which myself or the Other may participate,” and not situations in

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15 Here perhaps there is a misidentification between first-person perspective and subjective-intentional activity, which needs to be corrected.
which “a willful subject [...] performs acts or commits deeds” (Waldenfels 2011: 5), Waldenfels is remarkably close to the neo-phenomenological rehabilitation of involuntary life experiences.

All our behavior arises from a sort of self-affection we undergo as we respond to it. We are older than ourselves. As a result of our birth and a chain of rebirths, we are incapable of making up our Selbstvorsprung, our precedence to ourselves. The birth of sense out of pathos, mentioned above, is reinforced in the birth of myself out of pathos. My posteriority generates an irreducible sort of alienness which I call ecstatic alienness. (Waldenfels 2011: 51)

Responsiveness is therefore a “principle of insufficient reason” (Waldenfels 2011: 30). This, however, deserves detailed consideration. Experience is a sort of double movement. A pathic moment, the “by what” of having been overcome (now more and now less intense, now more contingent and now more lasting), is followed by a response that is necessarily a little delayed (and possibly also creative). The responsive resonance therefore is not simultaneity but a diastasis, a temporal shift where “answerability precedes the responsibility for everything that we do and say” (Waldenfels 2011: 36), thus transcending both any trivally dialogic model, since it is not a sense-directed or rule-guided behavior, and any moral foundation, because it precedes every moral or legal claim.

The alien as alien requires a responsive form of phenomenology that begins with that which challenges us, calls upon us, or puts our own possibilities in question in an alienating, shocking, or amazing fashion before we enter into our own wanting-to-know and wanting-to-understand situation. The pathos of the alien surpasses its questionability. (Waldenfels 2011: 36)

In its four aspects – singularity (in the sense of exceptionality), inevitability (in the sense that it exerts an irresistible “drive”), unreachable deferment (as it is absurd to speak of an original present), non-eliminable asymmetry (excluding common goals and common rules) – responsivity would therefore be based on a logic that is considerably different “from the logic of intentional acts, from the logic of comprehension, or from the logic of communicative action” (Waldenfels 2011: 39). The alien to which one is required to respond “originates from an irrevocable ‘once upon a time’ and from an irrevocable ‘elsewhere’” (Waldenfels 2011: 41), regarding which the “what?” or the “who?” come too late.
So far I have discussed Waldenfels’ theory of responsiveness\textsuperscript{16}, where he replaces “intersubjectivity” with Merleau-Ponty’s “intercorporeality”. But how does responsivity imply a felt-bodily responsonrium, a corporeality involving me “without being done by me” (Waldenfels 2011: 47), given that “the Other arises as co-original with myself and to some extent as preceding myself” (Waldenfels 2011: 53)? Waldenfels’ overcoming of traditional egocentrism entails going beyond language or at least considering its desubjectified and bodily, extra-semantic and extra-syntactical expressiveness (sounds, gestures, paralinguistic elements such as glances, mimicry, behavior, etc.)\textsuperscript{17}. Waldenfels examines how sensoriality, motility, expressiveness, eroticism and sexuality can be responsive, i.e. how they can engage as a real felt-bodily responsonrium in a bodily dialogue that responds to the claims of others and even things (heterosomatic). In so doing, he explores phenomena (“concrete emblems”) such as the voice, eyes, looks or gazes, hands, and libido, but also certain areas of the physical body and, finally, phenomena of synaesthesia and synergy. These are all bodily or felt-bodily responding aspects without ever being just an echo, a mere restitution of something else. They culminate in the response one gives to an unknown face, thus reaching the “non-place from which the alien claim emanates, without being able to locate it anywhere” (Waldenfels 2016: 532)\textsuperscript{18}.

As an example, let’s take the “grammar of gazes”, which also includes the gaze through which things appeal to us (Waldenfels 2016: 529-32). Alluding to a possible ethics of the gaze (Waldenfels 2016: 501-6), Waldenfels also talks about a) the different types of gaze (threatening, investigatory, supplicating, etc.) and the qualitatively differentiated contribution, tuned but also dystonic, with which a gaze eloquently accompanies dialogue. He then considers b) the oscillation of our gaze between b1) the gaze of others, b2) what one sees and b3) the gaze of a third party with whom the other comes into contact. Finally, he focuses on c) what the gaze of others suggests, for example through variations in the width of the eyelids, the direction of the gaze and the ocular motion and, as a result, the others’ way of orienting themselves towards

\textsuperscript{16} This theory is in turn perhaps responsive, given that the philosophical question itself should be conceived as a specific form of response (Waldenfels 2016: 319).
\textsuperscript{17} “The conception of language as a sign instrument is based on a partial disembodiment of language, on a transformation of the lived body of language into an available physical body of language” (Waldenfels 2016: 476).
\textsuperscript{18} The central mode of this kind of response is rather a qualitative attentiveness, a regard full of respect.
the world. The look or gaze behavior indirectly but effectively shows what the gaze of others is responsive to, and belongs to “those in-between events in which something happens as long as it connects to another” (Waldenfels 2016: 505).

5. Resonating felt-bodily isles

Rosa, Fuchs and Waldenfels have effectively introduced us to resonance as responsiveness. However, the time has come to compare their theories to my neo-phenomenological approach to the felt body as a sounding board for atmospheric feelings pervading a certain (lived) space (Griffero 2014c). Avoiding any reductionist objectification as well as the associationist explanatory hypothesis of outside qualities and quasi-things (of which atmospheres are an eminent example) (Griffero 2017a), my pathic-phenomenological aesthetics (Griffero 2019b) is more radical than the theories examined above in emphasizing the affective involvement that the perceiver feels unable to critically react to or mitigate the intrusiveness of. Let’s see how and why that is.

The neo-phenomenological suggestion is that, by means of its specific dynamics and lived “isles” (Schmitz 2011: 8-12; 2019: 89-109 and passim; Griffero 2017a: 55-67) the felt body acts as a perfect seismograph of one’s own and others’ emotional situation19. To put it differently (Slaby 2017), the felt body is a substantial proof for feelings, conceived as forms of global, inter- and supra-personal situations that, just like the sense of touch, always merge world-reference and self-reference together. This means that a feeling is not simply accompanied by a felt-bodily experience but is this felt-bodily experience, which, depending on what feeling it is, opens or closes a whole range of practical and cognitive possibilities. As a pre-reflective body or body-subject20, it sometimes works as a blind spot that makes any other perception and any contact with the world possible. The felt body feels with precision everything that happens in the surrounding area, including qualitative nuances unknown to the physical body, and always does so without drawing

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19 Therapists, for example, should also allow their own felt bodies to become a precise and diagnostically effective sounding board of their patients’ atmospheres (cfr. Griffero 2019a).

20 It “is not just a construct composed of limbs and organs, an ensemble of sensations and movements, [but rather] a felt body which was shaped in an historical sense, whose experiences have been settled in its invisible dispositions” (Fuchs 2008: 57).
on the five senses and the perceptual body schema. A significant part of this dialogue with the world stems from the fact that people are involved in atmospheric feelings that, being permanently embodied in portions of non-psychic reality, act as a scaffolding for their entire cognitive-affective life.

By discarding (at least partly) the existential ineffability to which introjectionism and physicalist reductionism inevitably lead, a neo-phenomenological strategy denies the disconsolate certainty that thematizing the felt body (instead of just living it) is equivalent to reifying it. Instead, new phenomenology aims to enhance the point of view of both the observer and the affectively involved person\(^{21}\) (how could one otherwise compare *Leib* and *Körper*?). Only by capitalizing on this relative abstraction can it be argued that felt-bodily isles – some universal and others culturally and historically more variable, some relatively more stable and others endowed with an intermittent existence depending on the momentary affective state – prove to be a precise tool for sensing the atmospheres’ quasi-thingly radiation. A great example of this is the diaphragmatic zone, activated by emotional grasping: even if it has its own peculiar voluminosity, this “isle” turns out to be completely irreducible to the organs contained in it.

The experienced intermodal analogicity of affordances is based precisely on their felt-bodily resonance in the perceiver’s felt-bodily isles, which become perfectly discernible within the strictly first-person phenomenal experience and especially thanks to the prevalence of the epiphenomenological dimension at the expense of the protopathic one. Because of their intermittent and vaguely delimited existence, felt-bodily isles create a real landscape whose topographical components are, in a certain sense, resonance zones that are diversified by both quality and intensity.

I am not trying to satisfy the obsessive epistemic need to localize quasi-anatomical and ephemeral affective states in order to make them less elusive and uncontrollable. This need, which is precisely at the origin of psychological concepts such as the body-schema or -image, actually comes too late compared to felt-bodily feelings, which are always more primal. However, I do not seek to fully embrace the suggestive pre-axial Greek vision of the body as something not unitary but irreducibly pluralistic. My task here is rather simply to detail the way in which

\(^{21}\) When totally separated, the two points of view originate – among other things – various psychopathological disorders.
the resonance of felt-bodily isles “constitutes” the emotional situation that involves us and which the ad-hoc felt-bodily unit is the momentary outcome of. My approach does not completely break with the pathic, and could therefore be called a “simultaneous reflection” (Fuchs 2000: 273).

Without repeating in detail the more general types of resonance triggered by atmospheres (narrowness and vastness) and analyzing felt-bodily communication (Griffero 2016; 2017b; 2017c), it will be sufficient to recall that, generally speaking, resonance can be discrepant and syntonic. However, I wish to add that, by inhibiting fluid bodily behaviour, a) discrepancy induces an epicritic contraction giving birth to individual felt-bodily isles of which the subject was previously unaware, but the awareness of which can sometimes lead to hypochondria through their pathological disorganization (independence). On the contrary, by facilitating bodily behaviour, b) syntony gives it a protopathic felt-bodily state of well-being that momentarily prevents some particular isles from emerging and promotes an uncritical fusion with the external reality. However, instead of going into further detail about these two general forms of resonance on the basis of Hermann Schmitz’ theory of felt-bodily communication, I prefer to focus on two more enigmatic types of atmospheric resonance.

6. Two odd cases

a) The first odd case is when one recognizes, and possibly even describes to others, an atmosphere without being personally involved in it (for a wide variety of reasons), namely when one detects a widespread feeling without having an experience-based point of view. Since a lived perception is never a mere socio-semiotic “reading” of a situation, but rather a somewhat engaging felt-bodily communication, only a low-intensity and felt-bodily sharing can really explain this softened kind of discrepant atmosphere (without involvement). If individuals could always merely observe the environing feelings in a disembodied way, they would unfailingly be able, in fact, to neutralize the undesired ones and even get rid of them. This low-intensity explanation has the merit, on the one hand, of recognizing that a bodily feeling is always transparently referred to the world, highlighting some aspects of it, and, on the other hand, of proving that even a neutral-cognitive observation implies a minimal affective component. By adopting this approach, I also embrace
Heidegger’s idea of a continuous and powerful — albeit not always conscious — affective situatedness, which is due to *Stimmungen* (moods or background atmospheres).

The felt-bodily resonance answering to an uninvolving atmospheric feeling could be explained as a two-stage process (first of encorporation and then of excorporation) or as a mixed one in the case of an instantaneous event (attraction-rejection). In the vocabulary of New Phenomenology, both cases show a (usually healthy) coexistence between the regression to the subjective facts of primitive presence and protoidentitary life, and emancipation towards an unfolded presence dissolving the subjective-involving perception through a relative ex-centric situative position. Hence a grey zone mixing absolutely subjective meanings and fade-neutral ones. Instead, the total lack of elasticity between these two poles is pathological. In short: the different resonance effect proves that some atmospheric feelings are resonance-conditioned, i.e. existing only when they are embodied and shared (for example, there can be no real atmosphere of courage without brave people making their collective feeling resound), but other atmospheres remain the same even when they are rejected and not shared, thus resonating very weakly (a landscape, for example, may be melancholic in itself and be regarded as such even if the spectator is and continues to be happy).

b) The second odd case is the reversed atmospheric experience (so to speak). This situation also demonstrates the quasi-objectivity of atmospheres and their different degree of authority (Griffero 2014b). Let’s start with the simplest case of direct authority. Schmitz repeatedly recalls the case of a cheerful person who, faced with people wrapped in an atmosphere of true and serious sadness, feels the authority of this sadness, respects it (not just for social etiquette) and, while not being infected by it, mitigates their own (evidently more limited) joyful atmosphere. As this case shows, some atmospheric feelings can legitimately claim to colonize the surrounding space more than others. This kind of binding authority usually happens in a discrepant-mimetic form, such as when persons become dull and gray like the gray and sultry morning that overwhelms them. The resonance of this prototypical (absolutely authoritarian) atmosphere results from a relationship that is so entangling as not to allow the experiencers to take any position towards what grabs them, nor to mobilize the critical reserves provided by their level of personal emancipation. This felt-bodily resonance is rationally uncontrollable and triggers a unilaterally antagonistic encorporation, due to
which one of the “partners” of the felt-bodily communication is in a sense “sucked into” the other’s prevailing felt-bodily narrowness.

There are also cases where this kind of binding authority paradoxically happens in a discrepant-reversed form. For example, a beautiful landscape and a lovely sunny day, precisely because of their beauty and relaxing-welcoming irradiation, may even sharpen someone’s (previous) sadness. This happens not because one perceives a sad landscape or day, but precisely because they feel that pleasant view and delighting sunshine as something alien and deeply irritating – to use Wilhelm Raabe’s literary example, a sad person takes nature’s beauty as mockery, as an insult, and starts to loathe all seven days of creation. This inverted affective correspondence is a form of mixed resonance, where repulsive narrowness and expansive vastness paradoxically go together and undoubtedly generate discomfort. This kind of resonance should not be necessarily confused with the pathological situation of an abnormal binding (too loose or too compact) between contraction and expansion. Rather, it is a very common slight atmospheric disorder with which we live perfectly well and which, precisely because of the unusual and contradictory resonance it’s based on, nurtures many works of art and explains the widespread feeling of nostalgia.

7. A phenomenal but also critical description

What are the advantages offered by this neo-phenomenological pathetic aesthetics?

a) Just like the inspiring Schmitzian theory of leibliche Kommunikation, a pathetic aesthetics tries to outline the resonance processes in a phenomenologically neutral way, i.e. without focusing (at least in the first instance) on their alleged modern degeneration.

b) It recognizes qualities of resonance not only in the human world but also in the object world. Truth be told, Rosa does the same by talking about horizontal resonance, but unfortunately he does not provide an appropriate explanation in felt-bodily terms. Others, like Habermas, omit it altogether, thus spreading an idea of communication that only implies human resonance relationships and, what’s more, only cognitive-linguistic and not affective-bodily relationships (and it is no surprise that Honneth’s recognition theory partially reintroduced these aspects).

c) My approach highlights the world’s immanent expressive qualities that are silenced by the reifying and reductionist tendency of modern
rationalism. Rosa’s perspective remains timidly bilateral, assuming that, if a certain space generates the recipient’s mood, then the latter’s psychic constitution (biography, social position, habits, etc.) is also responsible for the expressive character of that space. Instead, my neo-phenomenological approach rejects this second option (projectivism) on behalf of a radical emotional externalization. It can thus explain why the world’s affordances are not always projected by people on objects that act as special catalysts of their moods (i.e. diagonal resonance, in Rosa’s terms), but are often, if not above all, external feelings whose spatial resonance involves one’s felt body with an authority to which one cannot credibly object (i.e. vertical resonance, in Rosa’s terms).22

d) Rosa is right not to equate resonance as dialogue with harmony, fusion and contrast-free identity. This proviso, however, is totally superfluous in New Phenomenology, as it is always especially focused on the dramatic emotional involvements of involuntary life experiences. Hence Schmitz’s opposition to Moritz Geiger’s important theory of feelings resonance (Geiger 1911: 1928): the latter, in fact, would be excessively affected by an ideal harmony (instead of competition and possible conflict) between internal and external world, in enhancing the essential role of “external concentration” within the aesthetic experience. Equally superfluous for New Phenomenology is Rosa’s caveat that resonance cannot be intentionally increased and accumulated, i.e. reified and marketed like any other resource according to the imperative of competition and growth (the next trip must generate even more resonance…; the next concert will develop even more resonance…, etc.). Better: whereas Rosa concedes that the experience of resonance may also be given in a commodified context or initially have a simulatory nature, Schmitz excludes in principle the intentional generability and manipulability of (authentic) atmospheric feelings. Intentionally planned atmospheres cannot give life to those “rooted” situations in which he sees a relative corrective to the subjective autism and ironism of modernity. Anyway, one does not need to choose between Schmitz’s somewhat apocalyptic condemnation of today’s widespread “technique of impressions” and Rosa’s relatively more optimistic opinion on mass-media society. These options are both true according to the type of atmosphere one talks about: prototypical, derivative and spurious atmospheres.

22 See for example the effects of felt-bodily resonance produced by specific bodily practices (even on those who are just spectators!) such as tai chi, contemporary dance (especially if improvised) (Eberlein 2017).
(Griffero 2014a: 144) actually give rise to forms of resonance that are more or less external and intersubjective, more or less authoritative and strong, more or less intentional (plannable).

e) Another strong point of the neo-phenomenological perspective lies in recognizing the ancient origin of the Western increasing lack of resonance or porosity. In fact, whereas Rosa sees the catastrophe of resonance attested in literature and philosophy since the 19th century only as the telos of Modernity, Schmitz sees it as the common thread of the entire Western culture after Plato (the so-called psychologistic-reductionist-introjectionist paradigm) (Griffero 2019b: 21-41; 2019c: 17-28). He is therefore able to better explain the logical-ontological assumptions of a form of life that otherwise would seem to have arisen from nothing in recent times and be caused by capitalism alone.

The progressive sociologist and the pessimistic philosopher, to simplify, disagree once again. For Rosa, Modernity really leads to the catastrophe of resonance but, as anticipated by a line of thought going from Pietism to psychoanalysis, it also allows for resonance awareness (and not only resonance simulation). Modernity, in his view, for the first time promises that everyone should and can find their (physical, political, aesthetic, religious, sentimental, professional, etc.) place in the world and reasonably “feel at home” in some (allegedly) authentic and not only conventional dimension of life.

Schmitz’s much more critical perspective does not aim, however, to radically change the status quo or to disregard completely the constraints of tradition, as early phenomenology would. The healthy critical revision that Schmitz puts forward, based on the revival of what has been repressed by the prevailing theoretical diktat, lies in heterodoxically “surfing” between various philosophical trends, and the added value of this activity lies is the opportunity to “mock the strange illusion that it is always necessary to do something” (Schmitz 1965: 601). This disavowal of any kind of activist-intellectual arrogance enhances the pride of those who are mature enough – pathically sovereign and not rationally autonomous (Böhme 2008: 197) – to expose themselves profitably to the authority of the atmospheric-collective feelings they encounter in their spontaneous life experience, without deferring meaning and gratification to an uncertain future.

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23 As an unavoidable ontological and anthropological result of the rationalism of modern society (think of Weber’s disenchantment of the world but also Simmel’s blasé and Durkheim’s anomie) ending up in a desperate mode of living.
8. Conclusions

Regardless of these tensions, there is instead a point on which Rosa and Schmitz could agree: that is, the overcoming of the linear and therefore also instrumental conception of temporality. In fact, it is clearly impossible to be in resonance with an atmosphere, or to be really touched by it, when competition obstructs the “world pores”, thus forcing us to always wish to be elsewhere and to be doing something else (which is always allegedly better). Now Rosa wishes for a post-growth society that guarantees resources without feeling obliged to increase them, and whose innovations in all sectors, depending on the need, allow for oases of resonance and/or mute relationships (when a situation requires cold objectivity). This may give the impression that we could “have our cake and eat it”. Rosa certainly provides examples of how areas subject to the growth logic can be converted in areas of potential resonance (basic income, parks and zoos, share-economy, etc.) that have not (yet?) been colonised.

All this does not require an ontological revolution but simply a re-orientation of modern motivational energies: it is not a call for an anti-capitalist society but only a critique of capitalism. To those who believe that modern reification makes it impossible to overcome the growth logic, he replies both by seeing resonance as an anthropological universal (even if historically and culturally contingent in its practices) and by hoping that thanks to its scientific-technological results the general estrangement will result in a possibility of resonance for the majority of people. He thus defends the “normative monism” of resonance, even suggesting its provisional qualitative operationalization in what he calls “luminous eye index” (!).

Rosa’s main fear is that his perspective may appear to be anti-emancipatory. For this reason he surely seems to emphasize – more than New Phenomenology – the fact that a true resonance presupposes a two-way oscillation. This means that resonance always implies both the passive moment of being hit and involved – as self-transformation can only derive from the momentary loss of autonomy induced by the encounter with something unexpected – and the active moment of expressing oneself in an autonomous and self-acting way. Nonetheless, this oscillation is also admitted by New Phenomenology, for which subjects are such only when they maintain, as already mentioned, the right oscillation between the personal regression to primitive presence and
the personal emancipation to unfolded presence, i.e. between passivity and activity.

While distrusting over-speculative or vague theories, Rosa certainly agrees with (at least) three basic points of my theory of resonance-based atmospheres. a) The subject and the world are what they are only as a result of a previous in-between, thought of as a felt-bodily relationship and not as a unit or a mechanical coupling. b) The kind of experience to which the name “resonance” applies occurs especially when persons do not expect it, that is, when something unpredictable and unplannable happens to them. c) This also requires that the experiencers are in a suitable disposition to resonate.

So, my atmospherology simply adds the felt-bodily specification to the political-social tonality of this disposition required by Rosa. According to my approach, quasi-objective feelings diffused in the external (lived) space “may” be filtered in a (relatively) different way by different percipients. In other terms: their felt body may resonate differently, without these resonances ever fully coinciding with the atmospheres arousing them. More precisely, there is a need for both a micrological phenomenal description and a powerful critical revision of the cornerstones of our philosophy of history: thanks to the help of this special and remarkable double talent, a certain sociology that is also attentive to the bodily and pre-linguistic dimension and a certain phenomenology that is also attentive to situative and historical-collective dimensions may undoubtedly find – agreeing on the unavoidable and desirable pathicity of everyday life – an unexpected as well as promising scientific point of contact.

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