Perché il bello piace con la pretesa di un consenso universale? Le motivazioni kantiane e il problema della loro unità

Bernd Dörflinger

Abstract


The article deals with a very debated problem in Kant’s studies: the universality of the aesthetic judgment. This essay analyzes three different foundations of this kind of universality: the disinteresting nature of the aesthetic judgment, its relationship with the faculty of knowledge and the interest of the practical reason in the disinterested judgment.


Keywords


Aesthetic judgment; Universality; Disinteresting

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ISSN 0585-4733
ISSN DIGITALE 1825-8646

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