Simona Chiodo

The inclusive ideal.

A standard for our aesthetic and ethical

judgments

 

 

1.

Let us start with an example. I have to judge an aesthetic case: there are three faces in front of me, and I have to say whether they are beautiful, average, or ugly. They are quite different. The first one is characterized by symmetrical features, brown eyes, brown hair, a medium nose, and a medium mouth. The second one is characterized by symmetrical features, light-brown eyes, red hair, a medium nose, and a medium mouth. The third one is characterized by asymmetrical features, light-brown eyes, red hair, a very big nose, and a very small mouth. How am I going to judge the three faces? Is there any face judgeable beautiful, and why? Is there any face judgeable average, and why? And is there any face judgeable ugly, and why? I may say that I am likely to judge as follows: the first face is beautiful, the second face is average, and the third face is ugly. But why? And, moreover, are my judgments sensible?

Let us continue with another example. I have to judge an ethical case: there are three people in front of me, who are going to act in three ways, and I have to say whether their actions are good, average, or bad. Their actions are quite different. The first one is to sign a document stating the first person’s will not to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation. The second one is not to sign any document about active euthanasia in a painful health situation. The third one is to sign a document stating the third person’s will to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation. How am I going to judge the three actions? Is there any action judgeable good, and why? Is there any action judgeable average, and why? And is there any action judgeable bad, and why? I may say that I am likely to judge as follows: the first action is good, the second action is average, and the third action is bad. But why? And, moreover, are my judgments sensible?

In the following pages, I will try to argue that Kant’s notion of ideal can promisingly guide us in making the aforesaid aesthetic and ethical judgments.

 

2.

Kant is the philosopher who introduces the distinction between what an ideal is and what an idea is[1]. In the Critique of pure reason he distinguishes the former, “by which I understand the idea not merely in concreto but in individuo, i.e., as an individual thing which is determinable, or even determined, through the idea alone” (Kant 1781: A 568/B 596), from the latter. For instance, “Virtue, and with it human wisdom in its entire purity, are ideas. But the sage (of the Stoics) is an ideal, i.e., a human being who exists merely in thoughts, but who is fully congruent with the idea of wisdom” (Kant 1781: A 570/B 598). Therefore, he defines the idea as what “gives the rule” (Kant 1781: A 570/B 598) and the ideal as “the original image for the thoroughgoing determination of the [real] copy” (Kant 1781: A 570/B 598). More precisely, “the ideal is thus the original image (prototypon) of all things, which all together, as defective copies (ectypa), take from it the matter for their possibility, and yet although they approach more or less nearly to it, they always fall infinitely short of reaching it” (Kant 1781: A 578/B 606). And in the Critique of the Power of Judgment he adds that “Idea signifies, strictly speaking, a concept of reason, and ideal the representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea” (Kant 1790: 5: 232). For instance,

 

that archetype of taste, which indeed rests on reason’s indeterminate idea of a maximum, but cannot be represented through concepts, but only in an individual presentation, would better be called the ideal of the beautiful, something that we strive to produce in ourselves even if we are not in possession of it. But it will be merely an ideal of the imagination, precisely because it does not rest on concepts but on presentation, and the faculty of presentation is the imagination. (Kant 1790: 5: 232)

 

Let us highlight three essential characteristics of Kant’s ideal (characteristics which are essential for our argument as well):

1. the ideal is aesthetic at its roots, because it is an “image”, a “prototypon”, a “representation”, an “archetype”, a “presentation”, which results from the exercise of “imagination”;

2. the ideal is imaginable, and not realizable: its ontology is that of imagination, and not that of reality, because it “exists merely in thoughts”, and “things” “always fall infinitely short of reaching it”;

3. the ideal is produced, and not given, because it is “something that we strive to produce in ourselves”, and something that “we are not in possession of”.

Now, let us ask, together with Kant, “how do we attain such an ideal” (Kant 1790: 5: 232)? Kant answers as follows: “there are two elements involved here: first, the aesthetic normal idea, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination) that represents the standard for judging” (Kant 1790: 5: 233), “second, the idea of reason, which makes the ends of humanity insofar as they cannot be sensibly represented into the principle for the judging of its figure, through which, as their effect in appearance, the former are revealed” (Kant 1790: 5: 233). The latter, namely, “the idea of reason”, entails that any ideal has to do with “the expression of the moral” (Kant 1790: 5: 235). The former, namely, “the aesthetic normal idea”, entails that any ideal has the following genesis, which is essential for our argument: imagination

 

even knows how, by all accounts actually if not consciously, as it were to superimpose one image on another and by means of the congruence of several of the same kind to arrive at a mean that can serve them all as a common measure. Someone has seen a thousand grown men. Now if he would judge what should be estimated as their comparatively normal size, then (in my opinion) the imagination allows a great number of images (perhaps all thousand) to be superimposed on one another, and, if I may here apply the analogy of optical presentation, in the space where the greatest number of them coincide and within the outline of the place that is illuminated by the most concentrated colors, there the average size becomes recognizable, which is in both height and breadth equidistant from the most extreme boundaries of the largest and smallest statures; and this is the stature for a beautiful man. (Kant 1790: 5: 234)

 

In particular, “if in a similar way there is sought for this average man the average head, the average nose, etc., then this shape is the basis for the normal idea of the beautiful man in the country where this comparison is made” (Kant 1790: 5: 234). Let us analyse the meaning of “the aesthetic normal idea”, which is the first condition for the genesis of the ideal. The ideal results from a mechanism which proceeds from the empirical to the abstract: firstly, my eyes see “a thousand grown men” (and this is what is empirical), secondly, my imagination, by “superimpos[ing] one image on another”, gets “a mean”, i.e., a man who is “equidistant from the most extreme boundaries” (and this is what is abstract) – the first condition for the genesis of the ideal is “a mean”: it is precisely “a mean” that founds the ideal of the beautiful man. Speaking of “a mean” means speaking of the following process: if my eyes see, for instance, ten totally deformed men out of a thousand men, then the “mean” also results from them – the ideal of the beautiful man also results from totally deformed men, as any ideal also results “from the most extreme boundaries”.

Let us keep analysing the meaning of “the aesthetic normal idea” by focusing on the following argument by Kant: “This normal idea is not derived from the proportions taken from experience, as determinate rules; rather it is in accordance with it that rules for judging first become possible” (Kant 1790: 5: 234), which means that the “mean” is extremely important, because it is precisely the “mean” that determines the “rules for judging”. When I judge, for instance, that the man X is beautiful because his body is perfectly proportioned, the actual meaning of my judgment is the following: I recognize the perfect proportions of his body as the “rules for judging” not because they are perfect in themselves, but because they happen to “approach more or less nearly to” the “mean”. In the first case (they are perfect in themselves), I should say that a proportion P(X) is perfect a priori. Therefore, given the perfect proportion P(X), the man X, who happens to correspond quite accurately to the perfect proportion P(X), is judged beautiful. In the second case (they happen to “approach more or less nearly to” the “mean”), I should say that a proportion P(X) is perfect a posteriori. Therefore, given the proportion P(X) of the man X, the proportion P(Y) of the man Y, the proportion P(Z) of the man Z, and so forth, the man X, who happens to correspond quite accurately to the “mean” of the proportions P(X), P(Y), P(Z), and so forth, is judged beautiful (the man Y, who happens to correspond less accurately to the “mean” of the proportions P(X), P(Y), P(Z), and so forth, is judged average, and the man Z, who happens not to correspond in the least to the “mean” of the proportions P(X), P(Y), P(Z), and so forth, is judged ugly). There are two interesting consequences to highlight:

1. firstly, Kant’s ideal entails that, paradoxically enough, there is a precise sense in which the most beautiful is the most average: the most beautiful is the “mean[est]”. What I am actually saying when I judge the man X to be beautiful is that he happens to “approach more or less nearly to” the “mean” given by all the men I see “in the country where this comparison is made”;

2. secondly, Kant’s ideal entails that, paradoxically enough, there is a precise sense in which the most beautiful is also made by the ugliest. What I am actually saying when I judge the man X to be beautiful is that his beauty is made by the “mean” which results from all the men I see “in the country where this comparison is made”, the ugliest men included, i.e., “the most extreme” men included. Therefore, for instance, the man Z, who happens not to correspond in the least to the “mean” which results from the men X, Y, Z, and so forth, and who is judged ugly, also makes the man X beautiful.

We may argue that the most interesting consequence entailed by Kant’s ideal is the following: using the ideal means using an inclusive, and not exclusive, tool – more precisely, despite its outward extraneity to “the most extreme boundaries”, i.e., to the totally deformed, the ideal inwardly includes them at its very genesis: the ideal is a tool which does include, and does not exclude, “the most extreme boundaries”, i.e., the totally deformed.

 

3.

Now, let us analyse Kant’s argument about what the ideal is for, an argument which is essential for our reasoning. In the Critique of Pure Reason he argues that, once we have produced the ideal (any ideal) through both the exercise of our imagination and the exercise of our reason, “we have in us no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine human being, with which we can compare ourselves, judging ourselves and thereby improving ourselves, even though we can never reach the standard” (Kant 1781: A 569/B 597), because “These ideals, even though one may never concede them objective reality (existence), are nevertheless not to be regarded as mere figments of the brain; rather, they provide an indispensable standard for reason, which needs the concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, in order to assess and measure the degree and the defects of what is incomplete” (Kant 1781: A 569/B 597-A 570/B 598). Therefore, it is clear what the ideal is for: the ideal is “the standard” we use when, through the exercise of our reason, we judge beyond the universal necessity of science, i.e., we typically judge about both aesthetics and ethics – the ideal is “the standard” we typically use in both our aesthetic and our ethical judgments.

Kant argues that the ideal as “the standard” for our judgments works in two essential ways. The first one is strictly related to judging: the ideal is “the standard” “with which we can compare ourselves, judging ourselves”, “in order to assess and measure”. The second one is not strictly related to judging, because it proceeds from judging to what is most important, i.e., to acting: the ideal is the “standard for our actions”, through which we can “improv[e] ourselves”, once we have judged “the degree and the defects of what is incomplete”.

The use of the ideal in both aesthetics and ethics, together with the relationship between the former and the latter, is highlighted in the Critique of the Power of Judgment: “judging in accordance with such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and judging in accordance with an ideal of beauty is no mere judgment of taste” (Kant 1790: 5: 236). The reason why an aesthetic judgment founded on the ideal “can never be purely aesthetic” is that the ideal also results from “the idea of reason”, which entails “the expression of the moral”. But a more meaningful reason may be added: speaking about the ideal (about any ideal) is speaking about an aesthetic dimension (the ideal is an “image”, a “prototypon”, a “representation”, an “archetype”, a “presentation”) which strengthens an ethical dimension (the ideal works for our acting, after having worked for our judging). For instance, the ideal of the beautiful human being is an “image” which, precisely through the vivid power distinctively possessed by an aesthetic exemplar, can more easily make us judge the imperfections of our beauty and act in order to improve it, and the ideal of the good human being is an “image” which, precisely through the vivid power distinctively possessed by an aesthetic exemplar, can more easily make us judge the imperfections of our goodness and act in order to improve it. Therefore, there is a precise sense in which any ideal is both aesthetic and ethical: it is aesthetic if we consider where it results from (the exercise of imagination) and it is ethical if we consider what it is for (being the “standard for our actions”).

 

4.

Now, let us try to reason about the way we can use the ideal as a standard for its privileged dimensions, i.e., for our aesthetic and ethical judgments.

We already know that the ideal is produced, and not given, because it is “something that we strive to produce in ourselves”, and something that “we are not in possession of”. In particular, Kant gives us an extremely clear example: “hence under these empirical conditions a Negro must necessarily have a different normal idea of the beauty of a figure than a white, a Chinese person a different idea from a European” (Kant 1790: 5: 234). If we think about Kant’s world, then we can think about three separated societies (about three separated “countr[ies] where this comparison is made”): that of “a Negro”, that of “a Chinese”, and that of “a European”. And we can think that, even if each “Negro” produced his own ideal of the beautiful man founded on his own experience, his ideal would be quite analogous to that produced by any other “Negro”, even if each “Chinese” produced his own ideal of the beautiful man founded on his own experience, his ideal would be quite analogous to that produced by any other “Chinese”, and even if each “European” produced his own ideal of the beautiful man founded on his own experience, his ideal would be quite analogous to that produced by any other “European”. But what if we think about our contemporary world, i.e., what if we cannot think about separated societies (about separated “countr[ies] where this comparison is made”)?

Let us go back to the first example of the first paragraph: there are three faces in front of me, and I have to say whether they are beautiful, average, or ugly. I am likely to judge the first face (characterized by symmetrical features, brown eyes, brown hair, a medium nose, and a medium mouth) beautiful because I am Italian, and the first face happens to “approach more or less nearly to” the “mean” of the faces of “the country where this comparison is made”. But I am likely to change, and I am actually already changing, my judgment as my ideal of the beautiful face quite quickly shifts because the “mean” of the faces of “the country where this comparison is made” quite quickly shifts as well. In particular, I continuously experience several “Negro” faces and several “Chinese” faces. In this case, the important lesson I learn from Kant is the following: the inclusiveness of the ideal helps me understand that any ideal is supposed to shift as my empirical experience shifts, because the ideal actually has an empirical genesis – the inclusiveness of the ideal helps me understand that any ideal is not fixed at all (as any totalitarianism would assert), but that it is shifting. In other words, Kant’s lesson helps me develop a disposition to be inclusive as well, i.e., to welcome “the most extreme boundaries” through an authentic interest for what is most different, because what today is most different takes part in producing tomorrow’s ideal. Therefore, it does not even make sense to assert that, since my ideal of the beautiful face is that of the white face, then, considering my judgments, I will always judge “Negro” faces and “Chinese” faces ugly and, considering my actions, I will always avoid intimate relationships with “Negro” human beings and “Chinese” human beings.

Now, let us go back to the second example of the first paragraph, i.e., to the most important judgments of our contemporary world, which rule ethics, and, therefore, human beings’ actions and relationships: there are three people in front of me, who are going to act in three ways, and I have to say whether their actions are good, average, or bad. I am likely to judge the first action (to sign a document stating the first person’s will not to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation) good because I am Italian, and the first action happens to “approach more or less nearly to” the “mean” of the ways of thinking of “the country where this comparison is made” (supposing the first person wants to get ready for a possible future change, regarding the laws of his own country or to move to other countries characterized by other laws). Let us keep referring to the example: I am likely to judge the second action (not to sign any document about active euthanasia in a painful health situation) average because I am Italian, and the second action happens to “approach” less accurately the “mean” of the ways of thinking of “the country where this comparison is made”, and I am likely to judge the third action (to sign a document stating the third person’s will to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation) bad because I am Italian, and the third action happens not to “approach” in the least the “mean” of the ways of thinking of “the country where this comparison is made” (supposing the third person wants to get ready for a possible future change, regarding the laws of his own country or to move to other countries characterized by other laws). But what if I think about my contemporary country, i.e., what if I think about a country where the “mean” of the ways of thinking of “the country where this comparison is made” quite quickly shifts? In particular, I continuously experience several ways of thinking of the third kind (to sign a document stating the third person’s will to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation). Now, the crucial question is how I should proceed from judging to what is most important, i.e., to acting – how I should proceed from judging to legislating on acting.

 

5.

We may start from the following remark: paradoxically enough, there is frequently a divergence between judging and legislating. More precisely, we may describe what frequently happens as follows:

1. as Kant teaches us, we judge on the basis of our ideals as “standard[s] for reason”;

2. but, contra Kant’s lesson, we decide to forcedly consider our ideals to be fixed, and not to be shifting (we even decide to forcedly consider our ideals something that regresses through changes, rather than something that progresses through changes, something that we must save from changes, rather than something that we must save through changes);

3. therefore, we forcedly use exclusive, and not inclusive, ideals: we forcedly use ideals which result from “a mean” (wrongly) considered as the way of thinking of the majority of “the country where this comparison is made” (for instance, the Catholic way of thinking, if the country is Italy), and not (rightly) considered as resulting from the ways of thinking of the majority and the minorities of “the country where this comparison is made” (for instance, resulting from the Catholic, atheist, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and so forth, ways of thinking, if the country is Italy);

4. therefore, when we proceed from judging to legislating, we write exclusive, and not inclusive, laws: we write laws which (wrongly) protect the majority (for instance, a law according to which no citizen can choose active euthanasia in a painful health situation), and not laws which (rightly) protect the majority and the minorities (for instance, a law according to which the choice of active euthanasia in a painful health situation is up to each citizen, who can choose it or not on the basis of his own ideal of what constitutes the good man’s way of thinking about the relationship between life and death).

In other words, the paradox which frequently characterizes the relationship between judging and legislating is the following: even if the ideal is inclusive at its very genesis, we frequently lose its inclusiveness in judging and, moreover, in legislating – even if the ideal is inclusive at its very genesis, we frequently lose its power of including the minorities, i.e., “the most extreme boundaries”, in judging and, moreover, in legislating.

Indeed, we should not use the inclusiveness of the ideal if the case is that of a way thinking, firstly, and a way of acting, secondly, which are supposed to determine choices impacting other people’s lives, rather than choices impacting one’s own life. For instance, if the majority thinks and acts according to the ideal “The good man cannot kill beyond the limit of self-defence” and the minority thinks and acts according to the ideal “The good man can kill beyond the limit of self-defence”, then we should not judge and legislate on the basis of an inclusive ideal which results from their “mean” (i.e., we should write a law against killing beyond the limit of self-defence), since the minority’s thinking and acting would determine choices impacting other people’s lives (if I kill you beyond the limit of self-defence, then I determine your choice over your own life: indeed, I determine that you cannot choose anything at all). But, if the majority thinks and acts according to the ideal “The good man cannot commit suicide” and the minority thinks and acts according to the ideal “The good man can commit suicide”, then we should judge and legislate on the basis of an inclusive ideal which results from their “mean” (i.e., we should not write a law against committing suicide), since the minority’s thinking and acting would not determine choices impacting other people’s lives (if I commit suicide, then I do not determine your choice over your own life). More precisely, any action of ours can influence other people’s choices over their own lives (if I commit suicide, then I can influence your choice of committing suicide as well, if you love me, or of celebrating, if you hate me), but we should try to distinguish between influencing and determining – and we may argue that we should try to use the inclusiveness of the ideal anytime we are not determining other people’s choices over their own lives.

Therefore, the judgments from which we started are typical judgments in which we should try to use the inclusiveness of the ideal. More precisely, what if, through the inclusiveness of the ideal, we try to decrease the divergence between judging and legislating in the case of euthanasia? We may describe what should happen as follows:

1. as Kant teaches us, we judge on the basis of our ideals as “standard[s] for reason”;

2. and, pro Kant’s lesson, we consider our ideals to be shifting (we even consider our ideals something that progresses through changes, something that we must save through changes);

3. therefore, we use inclusive ideals: we use ideals which result from “a mean” considered as the result of the ways of thinking of the majority and the minorities of “the country where this comparison is made” (for instance, the result of the religious and atheist ways of thinking about what constitutes the good man’s way of thinking about the relationship between life and death in the case of euthanasia, if the country is Italy);

4. therefore, when we proceed from judging to legislating, we write inclusive laws: we write laws which protect the majority and the minorities (for instance, a law according to which the choice of active euthanasia in a painful health situation is up to each citizen, who can choose it or not on the basis of his own ideal of what constitutes the good man’s way of thinking about the relationship between life and death). And, moreover, we think that it does not even make sense to assert that, since the majority’s ideal of what constitutes the good man’s way of thinking about the relationship between life and death is religious, then, if we consider our legislating, we will always legislate contra active euthanasia and, if we consider our acting, we will always avoid intimate relationships with human beings who sign a document stating their will to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation.

 

6.

The examples considered make us reason about a most meaningful issue: why do we frequently find a divergence between judging and legislating? More precisely, why do we frequently legislate on the basis of a criterion according to which what guides us is “a mean” which (wrongly) coincides with the way of thinking of the majority, even if, following Kant’s argument, our “standard for judging”, which is the ideal, is founded on “a mean” which (rightly) coincides with the result of the ways of thinking of the majority and the minorities?

The answer seems to be given by the example of killing: the majority, which believes in the ideal “The good man cannot kill beyond the limit of self-defence”, decides to be guided by “a mean” which coincides with the ideal “The good man cannot kill beyond the limit of self-defence” in order to protect its own possibility of choosing from the minority, which believes in the ideal “The good man can kill beyond the limit of self-defence”. But what if we substitute the ideal “The good man can kill beyond the limit of self-defence” with something that does not entail the protection of the majority’s own possibility of choosing? Again, this is the case of several aesthetic and ethical judgments:

1. if the majority believes in an ideal of human beauty according to which “The beautiful face is characterized by symmetrical features, brown eyes, brown hair, a medium nose, and a medium mouth”, then we should not even think that it is sensible to request the protection of the majority’s own possibility of choosing (of choosing its own aesthetic status, in this case) from the minority which believes in an ideal of human beauty according to which “The beautiful face is characterized by asymmetrical features, light-brown eyes, red hair, a very big nose, and a very small mouth”;

2. if the majority believes in an ideal of human goodness according to which “The good man’s action is to sign a document stating his will not to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation”, then we should not even think that it is sensible to request the protection of the majority’s own possibility of choosing (of choosing its own ethical status, in this case) from the minority which believes in an ideal of human goodness according to which “The good man’s action is to sign a document stating his will to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation”.

In other words, we should use the perspicuity of several aesthetic cases in order to make it perspicuous that we can solve several ethical cases, which seem to be more complicated, just analogously, because their radical criterion is just analogous: both the former and the latter are founded on the ideal as “the standard for judging” – and speaking about the ideal means speaking about “a standard” which, despite its outward exclusiveness (i.e., despite its having outwardly nothing to do with what is most different from the majority, and with what we may call empirical imperfections), is actually inwardly inclusive (i.e., has actually inwardly to do with what is most different from the majority, and with what we may call empirical imperfections).

 

7.

Therefore, Kant’s ideal can promisingly guide us in making aesthetic and ethical judgments because its inclusiveness entails two essential resources:

1. a tool which seems to be crucial for a contemporary world characterized by the quick disappearance of societies in which there is a clear presence of a big majority and small minorities, i.e., by the quick appearance of societies in which there is a clear presence of not too big a majority and not too small minorities, or even the absence of a majority and the presence of a constellation of quite big minorities;

2. a tool which seems to be crucial for a contemporary world characterized, therefore, by the necessity of decreasing the divergence between inclusively judging and exclusively legislating, which means the divergence between individual requests and super-individual laws.

Kant proposes us the ideal as “the standard for judging”, and we may argue that it is actually promising because of what we may call its inclusiveness, which comes from its empirical genesis (the ideal is produced, and not given, because it is “something that we strive to produce in ourselves”, and something that “we are not in possession of”) and extends to the ultimate power of its aestheticity (the ideal is an “image”, a “prototypon”, a “representation”, an “archetype”, a “presentation”, which result from the exercise of “imagination”) on our actions and relationships.

 

 

Bibliography

 

Emmet, D., The role of the unrealisable. A study in regulative ideals, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994.

Kant, I., Anthropologie Collins, AA XXV. Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1772/1773 Collins, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 25.1, hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1997.

Kant, I., Anthropologie Friedländer, AA XXV. Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1775/1776 Friedländer, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 25.1, hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1997.

Kant, I., Anthropologie Mrongovius, AA XXV. Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1784/1785 Mrongrovious, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 25.2, hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1997.

Kant, I., On the form and principles of the sensible and the intelligible world (inaugural dissertation, 1770), in Theoretical philosophy 1755-1770, ed. by D. Walford with R. Meerbote, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Kant, I., Erläuterungen, AA XIX. Erläuterungen Kants zu A.G. Baumgartens Initia philosophiae practicae primae, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 19, hrsg. von der königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1934.

Kant, I., Reflexionen, AA XV. Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 15, hrsg. von der königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1923.

Kant, I., Critique of pure reason (1781), ed. and tr. by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Kant, I., Critique of the power of judgment (1790), ed. by P. Guyer, tr. by P. Guyer and E. Matthews, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Nuzzo, A., Idea and ideal in Kant’s “De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis (1770)”, in T. Rockmore, ed. by, New essays on the precritical Kant, Amherst, Humanity Books, 2001, pp. 224-239.

Nuzzo, A., Ideal embodiment. Kant’s theory of sensibility, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2008.

Rescher, N., Cognitive idealization. On the nature and utility of cognitive ideals, London, Cambridge Scholars Press, 2003.

Rescher, N., Ethical idealism. An inquiry into the nature and function of ideals, Berkeley-Los Angeles-New York, University of California Press, 1987.



[1] Starting from his precritical writings: see Anthropologie Collins, AA XXV. Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1772/1773 Collins, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 25.1, hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1997; Anthropologie Friedländer, AA XXV. Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1775/1776 Friedländer, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 25.1, hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1997; Anthropologie Mrongovius, AA XXV. Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1784/1785 Mrongrovious, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 25.2, hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1997; On the form and principles of the sensible and the intelligible world (inaugural dissertation, 1770), in Theoretical philosophy 1755-1770, ed. by D. Walford with R. Meerbote, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992; Erläuterungen, AA XIX. Erläuterungen Kants zu A.G. Baumgartens Initia philosophiae practicae primae, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 19, hrsg. von der königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1934; Reflexionen, AA XV. Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 15, hrsg. von der königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1923.

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